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IN RE QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL: DOES
SELECTIVE WAIVER EXIST FOR MATERIALS DISCLOSED
DURING A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION?
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all."'
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of corporate wrongdoing, regulators, legislatures, and
the public have demanded greater transparency of corporate transactions
through government investigations. In conjunction with these investiga-
tions, corporations are encouraged to cooperate with government agen-
cies, including, but not limited to the Department of Justice ("DOJ") 2 and
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), 3 by releasing privi-
leged and protected documents. Cooperation may include the decision to
waive the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection for infor-
mation produced to the DOJ and SEC.4 It may also include a decision to
sign a confidentiality agreement protecting the selectively disclosed
documents from further disclosure to adversarial third parties.5
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (describing the attorney-client
privilege).
2. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm (setting forth factors that federal prosecu-
tors should weigh in determining whether to bring criminal charges against a corporation). On
December 12, 2006, the DOJ released the McNulty Memorandum to replace the Thompson Memo-
randum, in response to the growing concern that the Thompson Memorandum was having an ad-
verse effect on the attorney-client privilege. The McNulty Memorandum is a significant step for-
ward in protecting attorney-client privilege, but does not go far enough to restore the balance be-
tween federal prosecutors and corporations under investigation. See Memorandum from Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice to of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf.
3. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21 (A) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Deci-
sions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,44969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
AE-1470, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report] (setting forth criteria
the SEC will employ in determining whether it should give credit for cooperation during investiga-
tion).
4. Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need For a New Look at Selective Waiver in
SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761, 761 (2006). Under the McNulty Memorandum, prose-
cutors may request a waiver in furtherance of their law enforcement obligations. McNulty Memo-
randum, supra note 2, at 8. Furthermore, before requesting a waiver, "prosecutors must obtain
written authorization from the United States Attorney" who must then "consult with the Assistant
Attorney General[,] before granting or denying [a waiver request]." Id. at 9. Declination of a waiver
may be considered against the corporation if and when it is charged. Id. at 10.
5. See Dore, supra note 4, at 762.
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The majority of federal circuit courts of appeals, including the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuit find that
disclosure of materials during a government investigation waives the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.6 The Eight Circuit
and a few district courts embrace the concept of selective or limited
waiver in some situations, including where a confidentiality agreement
has been signed by a corporation and the government agency. However,
confusion remains over the applicability of selective waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrine during government inves-
tigations.
In In re Qwest Communications International, Inc.,8 the Tenth Cir-
cuit chose not to adopt selective waiver and instead referred to the "na-
ture of the common law to move slowly and by accretion." 9 The court
thought that Qwest Communications International ("Qwest") sought an
entirely new privilege, a "government-investigation privilege," that
would constitute a "leap ... in the common law development of privi-
leges and protections."' 0 In failing to clarify the issue of selective
waiver, the Tenth Circuit further muddied the waters for corporations
faced with a waiver request.
Part I of this article provides a history of the attorney-client privi-
lege, work-product doctrine, and theory of selective waiver. Part II dis-
cusses the split among the federal circuit courts over the issue of selec-
tive waiver. Part III introduces the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re
Qwest Communications International, Inc. Part IV analyzes the culture
of waiver, confidentiality agreements, proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502 concerning selective waiver, policy reasons for adopting se-
lective waiver under limited circumstances, and the purported chilling
effect a rule of selective waiver would have on attorney-client communi-
cations. Finally, the conclusion addresses steps for rectifying the split
among the federal circuit courts.
I. BACKGROUND
The following sections briefly discuss the origins and applications
of the attorney-client privilege, work-product doctrine, and selective
waiver to corporations involved in government investigations.
6. Id. at 761 (defining selective waiver as a waiver of materials protected by the attorney-
client privilege and/or work product doctrine).
7. See Kathryn Keneally and Kenneth M. Breen, New Life for Selective Waiver, 30
CHAMPION 42, 43 (2006).
8. In re Qwest Commic'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
584 (2006).
9. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1192.
10. Id.
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A. Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations
The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are distinct
bodies of law that serve different purposes." The attorney-client privi-
lege is a common law rule of evidence 12 which governs the type of evi-
dence admitted in court.13  The attorney-client privilege is the oldest
privilege relating to confidential communications, dating from the Six-
teenth century.14 The purpose is "to encourage full and frank communi-
cation between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."'
' 5
The attorney-client privilege covers communication between lawyer and
client where the client is the holder of the privilege.' 6 The attorney client
privilege is "construed narrowly" because it "obstructs the truth finding
process."'
17
The attorney-client privilege has a distinct application to corpora-
tions and other business entities. Unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, 18 the attorney-client privilege may be asserted
by a corporation or other organization to protect documents produced
during business operations.' 9 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the effect of the attorney-client privilege on corporations in Upjohn
v. United States.20  While confusion remains over what communications
made by corporations and their agents are covered by the privilege,2' it is
essential to clarify the issue of selective waiver to "ensure voluntary cor-
porate compliance with the law," without waiving any protective rights.22
11. See Karen L. Valihura & Robert J. Valihura, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine: Corporate Applications, in BNA CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES PORTFOLIO No. 22-3 §
XIV (2000).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
13. LISA G. LERMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 165 (2005).
14. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
15. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
16. See LERMAN, supra note 13, at 165.
17. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1988);
see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
18. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944) (denying corporations protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, on the ground that the constitutional
prohibition against self-incrimination protects only natural persons).
19. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 99 (4th ed. 2001); see also United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318,
336 (1915) (recognizing the availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations).
20. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (holding that the lower courts' application of a narrowly con-
strued attorney-client privilege "makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice
when their client is faced with a specific legal problem [and] also threatens to limit the valuable
efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law").
21. Some courts rely on Wignore's treatise to support the position that legally related attor-
ney-client communications are protected. See Valihura, supra note 11, § VI; WIGMORE, supra note
14, § 2317. Other courts find that the attorney-client privilege only protects legal advice in response
to information communicated by the client. Valihura, supra note 11, VI.; see also Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 102.
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B. Work-Product Doctrine for Corporations
The work-product doctrine embraces many of the same concepts of
the attorney-client privilege, yet is distinct from and more expansive than
the attorney-client privilege.23 The doctrine was originally discussed in
the Supreme Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor,24 reaffirmed in United
States v. Nobles,25 and codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). 26  Hickman established protection for materials collected by
counsel in preparation for possible litigation, absent a showing from the
adversarial party of sufficient need for the materials.27 Furthermore, it
protects the attorney's thoughts, mental impressions, and theories, from
disclosure. 28  Unlike the attorney-client privilege, work-product protec-
tion historically belongs to the attorney 29 and is not waived unless disclo-
sure occurs to an adversary.3 °
The work-product doctrine also applies to corporations. 31 The ma-
jority of cases conclude that internal investigations of possible illegal
activity by the corporation performed in close proximity to litigation
qualify for coverage under the work-product doctrine.
32
C. Selective Waiver
Protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine is not absolute.33 Protection is waived to privileged
material if the client, client's attorney, or agent of the client agrees to
waive the privilege.34 Many courts find action evidencing a disregard for
the confidential nature of a legal communication is enough to waive pro-
tection under the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege.35
23. Valihura, supra note 11; see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
24. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
25. 422 U.S. at 236-39.
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also include a provi-
sion codifying work-product protection for pre-trial discovery in criminal proceedings. See FED. R.
CaiM. P. 16(b)(2).
27. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 480-81 (summarizing Hickman, 329 U.S. 495).
28. See FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
29. Valihura, supra note 11.
30. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1428; cf Reliance Ins. Co. v. McNally Inc., No:
89-2401-V, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22605, at *9 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 1992) (declining to find a waiver
when two parties with a common legal interest share information).
31. JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE §7.06 (3d. ed. 2000).
32. See In re Int'l Sys., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979).
33. Valihura, supra note 11, § VII; Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78(1) (2000).
35. Valihura, supra note 11, § VII. See generally In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality
of attorney-client communications like jewels"); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp.
771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (holding that "[o]ne cannot produce documents and later assert a privi-
lege which ceases to exist because of the production"); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61
F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that "once the secrecy or confidentiality is destroyed by a
voluntary disclosure to a third party, the rationale for granting the privilege in the first instance no
longer applies").
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Courts reason that if the client is indifferent to maintaining confidential-
ity to privileged materials, the law should not protect the privilege at the
expense of other parties with an interest in the materials.36
In the corporate context, the law governing selective waiver of at-
torney-client privilege and work-product doctrine is unsettled.37 Of par-
ticular concern is the applicability of selective waiver in the context of
government investigations. Some courts find that turning over privileged
materials to the government does not necessarily waive the attorney-
client privilege or work-product protection.38 Yet others, following the
strict language of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trine, reject the idea of selective waiver.39 Courts rejecting selective
waiver have reasoned that selective invocation of the privilege is an
abuse of discretion. 40 Because "the privilege prevents forced disclosure"
of materials to adversarial third parties, courts do not allow clients to
pick and choose when to assert the protection.41
II. SELECTIVE WAIVER AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, the majority of federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals reject the selective waiver doctrine. The following
sections discuss the decisions of the circuits addressing selective waiver.
Section A reviews the Eighth Circuit's minority view for allowing selec-
tive waiver. Section B reviews the decisions of the majority of federal
circuit courts rejecting selective waiver. Despite the common conclusion
36. See GERGACZ, supra note 31, §§ 5.04-5.05.
37. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th
Cir. 2002) (stating that the case law addressing selective waiver is "in a state of hopeless confusion."
(citing In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co. Inc., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993))).
38. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding selec-
tive waivers applicable in certain circumstances); see also Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128
F.3d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding of forfeiture where the government failed to obtain a confi-
dentiality agreement); In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that if the
government agrees to maintain confidentiality, disclosure of documents does not constitute a
waiver); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that disclosure to the SEC constitutes a complete waiver unless privilege is
specifically reserved at the time of disclosure).
39. See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1425 (hold-
ing that selective waiver to the government was "laudable," but did not serve the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that maintaining the attorney-client privilege "makes the law more predictable and.., eases
its administration"); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to
embrace the concept of limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the court found that when "a
client communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be
revealed to others, that information . . . will not enjoy the privilege." (quoting United States v.
(Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984))); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,
1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding the attorney-client privilege available to a litigant who maintains
"genuine confidentiality").
40. GERGACZ, supra note 31, § 5.05.
41. Id. (citing Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (holding that the "party
asserting the privilege placed information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for
his own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such information would
have been manifestly unfair to the opposing party").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the federal circuit courts that selective waiver does not afford protec-
tion to voluntarily disclosed materials, the lack of uniformity in reason-
ing among the circuits is of great concern.
A. Minority View: Disclosure in Certain Circumstances Does Not Con-
stitute Waiver
Only a few courts have sanctioned or adopted a per se rule against
selective waiver;42 this leaves the door open for use of selective waiver
under certain circumstances.43
The majority of arguments in favor of selective waiver gain their
credence from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Diversified Industries v.
Meredith.44 In Diversified, "[t]he Weatherhead Company sought an in-
ternal [investigation] report prepared by outside counsel for Diversified's
independent audit committee." 45 The resulting report was later disclosed
to the SEC pursuant to subpoena.46 Finding for Diversified, the court
asserted that the documents disclosed to the SEC were within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and, thus,
protected from further disclosure.47 Judge Henley held that production of
the documents to the SEC constituted a limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege: "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders and customers.
'" 8
Although the Eighth Circuit continues to follow this rule, it stands
alone among federal circuit courts. However, Judge Boggs, sitting in the
Sixth Circuit, provided in his dissent in In re Columbia/HCA,49 well-
reasoned support for the theory of selective waiver.50 Recognizing the
important public policy interest of cooperating with the government,
Judge Boggs stated that "[although] the harms of selective disclosure are
not altogether clear, the benefits of the increased information to the gov-
42. See infra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 606; In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236;
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing voluntary disclosure of
privileged material to the SEC for purposes of nonpublic informal investigation, a proceeding to
which plaintiffs were not a party, did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege); Saito v.
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553 2002 WL 31657622, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the
many circumstances and policy reasons for allowing selective waiver); Maruzen Co., Ltd. v. HSBC
USA, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1079, 2002 WL 1628782, at *1 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (holding that voluntary
disclosure to government agencies pursuant to an explicit non-waiver agreement does not waive the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine).
44. 572 F.2d 596.
45. See Dore, supra note 4, at 762; Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 599-600.
46. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 599-600.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 611.
49. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
50. Id. at 307-14 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
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emiment should prevail., 51 He characterized the court's choice as "not
one whether or not to release privileged information to private parties
that has already been disclosed to the government, but rather one to cre-
ate incentives that permit voluntary disclosures to the government at
all. 52 Judge Boggs opined that other methods, such as search warrants
and civil discovery, would not reach privileged materials and may con-
sume additional government time and money. 3 Finally, the dissent re-
jected the majority claim that enforcement of the rule would be burden-
some and possibly expensive, stating that the exception "seems clear and
predictable," and "as rule-like as this court makes it."
54
B. The Majority View: Disclosure Constitutes Waiver
The majority of federal circuit courts reject selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.55 However, not all
circuits have done so for the same reason. The following review of fed-
eral circuit court decisions are broken into three categories: 1) circuits
rejecting selective waiver with a confidentiality agreement; 2) circuits
rejecting selective waiver without a confidentiality agreement; and 3)
circuits rejecting selective waiver based on the facts in the case, not on
the theory alone.
1. Selective Waiver With a Confidentiality Agreement
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines,56 the
Philippines government alleged that Westinghouse bribed its former
President to procure a contract to build the nation's first nuclear power
plant.57  During investigations of the alleged bribe, Westinghouse dis-
closed an internal investigation report to the SEC58 based on the agency's
confidentiality regulations, and subsequently to the DOJ, pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement. 59  The Philippines sought discovery of this
report and the underlying documents.6° Westinghouse refused, citing the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, arguing that a confi-
51. Id. at 311 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
52. Id. at 312 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
53. Id. at 311-12 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
54. Id. at 313 (Boggs, J. dissenting).
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. 951 F.2d 1414.
57. Id. at 1417.
58. Id. Westinghouse relied on SEC regulations stating that "[i]nformation or documents
obtained by the [SEC] in the course of any investigation or examination, unless made a matter of
public record, shall be deemed non-public." Id. at 1418 n.4 (citing 17 CFR § 203.2 (1978)). SEC
regulations "further provided that information or documents obtained in the course of an investiga-
tion would be deemed and kept confidential by SEC employees and officers unless disclosure was
specifically authorized." Id. (citing 17 CFR § 240.0- 4 (1978)).
59. Id. at 1417. The agreement between Westinghouse and the DOJ stated in part that: (1) the
DOJ could review the attomey-client privileged and work product protected materials; (2) the mate-
rials would not be disclosed outside of the DOJ; and (3) that such review would not undermine
work-product protection and attomey-client privileges afforded to Westinghouse. Id. at 1419.
60. Id. at 1420.
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dentiality agreement specifically stated that disclosure to the DOJ did not
constitute a waiver.
61
The Third Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's approach to waiver
62
and held that selective waiver "has little to do with" the underlying pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege to encourage clients to seek legal
advice.6 3 The court noted that several factors warn against creating a
new privilege allowing parties to disclose materials to the government
without waiving the attorney-client privilege.64  Finally, the fact that
Westinghouse and the DOJ entered into a confidentiality agreement
made no difference. 65  In the court's view, voluntary disclosure to an-
other party waives the attorney-client privilege, regardless of whether the
party agrees not to disclose the communications through a confidentiality
agreement or compulsion through subpoena.66
In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,67 the Sixth Circuit up-
held a district court decision that Columbia/HCA waived protection to
written reports summarizing results and findings from internal audits
supplied to the DOJ in conjunction with an investigation.68  Colum-
bia/HCA initially asserted that the documents relating to those audits
were protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doc-
trine.69 Columbia/HCA argued that it had not waived any privilege pro-
tection over the documents by voluntarily disclosing them to the DOJ
because they had entered into a confidentiality agreement with the
DOJ.70  The Sixth Circuit found that any voluntary disclosure of privi-
leged documents to a third party operates as a complete waiver of other-
wise applicable immunities from production.71
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1425. The Eighth Circuit rejected the selective waiver justification in Diversified
because "selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's attorney
in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to govern-
ment agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose." Id. Moreover, the
court noted, "selective waiver does nothing to promote the attorney-client relationship; indeed, the
unique role of the attorney, which led to the creation of the privilege, has little relevance to the
selective waiver permitted in Diversfied." Id.
63. Id. at 1424. The Third Circuit relied heavily on the decision in Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981), that however laudable cooperation may be, selective waiver
is beyond the intended purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1424-25.
64. Id. at 1425-26 ("First, because privileges obstruct the truth-finding process, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned the federal courts to be cautious in recognizing new privileges. In
addition, the Supreme Court has been 'especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where
it appears that Congress has considered the competing concerns but has not provided the privilege
itself... Congress rejected an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, proposed by
the SEC, that would have established a selective waiver rule regarding documents disclosed to the
agency).
65. Id. at 1426-27.
66. Id.
67. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
68. Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 289.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 293.
71. Id. at 300-02.
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2. Selective Waiver Without a Confidentiality Agreement
In Permian Corp. v. United States,72 the D.C. Circuit held that dis-
closure of documents to the SEC by a subsidiary of Permian, Occidental,
waived the attorney-client privilege to the documents.73 Although the
district court found that documents sought by the Department of Energy
in an unrelated investigation were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege, the D.C. Circuit found Occidental waived the privilege by disclos-
ing the documents to the SEC.74 The court expressly rejected the Eighth
Circuit's selective waiver theory, finding the argument "wholly unper-
suasive," and concluded that unfair results would occur by allowing liti-
gants to convert "the privilege into a tool for selective disclosure., 75 The
court noted that letters sent between Occidental and the SEC may have
created an implicit confidentiality agreement between the two parties, but
Occidental did little to protect the waiver documents once they changed
hands.76
In In re Martin Marietta Corp. ,77 the Fourth Circuit strictly inter-
preted the selective waiver doctrine in the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine context. 78 Faced with charges that Martin Mari-
etta defrauded the Department of Defense and committed mail fraud,
Martin Marietta, upon invitation of the U.S. Attorney, submitted a posi-
tion paper to the U.S. Attorney detailing why the company should not be
prosecuted.79 The position paper was later sought by an indicted em-
ployee for use in his defense against charges arising out of the same ac-
tivities.8°
The Fourth Circuit discussed the many "competing policy con-
cerns" that have led courts to carve out exceptions to the rule of waiver.8 '
However, the court rejected Martin Marietta's argument for selective
waiver because the indicted employee sought materials that had already
been revealed to the government.8 2 The court noted the adversarial in-
terests of the two parties involved in the litigation, that Martin Marietta
made an express assurance of completeness of its disclosure to the U.S.
Attorney, and that the disclosures were made in an attempt to settle on-
72. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73. Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1219.
74. Id.
75. Id at 1220-21. Judge Abner Mikva characterized the privilege as resting on the need for
secrecy between a lawyer and his client, and that turning documents over to the SEC was inconsis-
tent with this need for confidentiality. Id.
76. Id. at 1219-20.
77. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
78. Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d at 626.
79. Id at 623.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 623 (Noting concerns such as "facilitating the settlement of litigation, permitting full
cooperation among joint defendants, expediting discovery and encouraging voluntary disclosure to
regulatory agencies").
82. Id at 623-24.
2007)
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going controversies.8 3  Therefore, the position paper submitted to the
U.S. Attorney was not entitled to protection.
84
In United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,85 the First
Circuit upheld in part and vacated in part a district court decision that the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's ("MIT") disclosure of its legal
bills to a government agency waived the attorney-client privilege to those
materials, thus, requiring MIT to turn over the legal bills to the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"). 86  In reaching its decision, the First Circuit
favored adherence to clear rules, rather than abandoning them in favor of
an unstructured doctrine. 87 Moreover, the court rejected the idea that a
tacit agreement between MIT and the IRS protected the privileged mate-
rials that were later disclosed, because anyone who discloses documents
has an incentive to do so.
8 8
3. Rejection of Selective Waiver Based on Case Facts
In In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.,89 the Second Circuit held that
Steinhardt Partners, subject to an SEC investigation, waived work-
product protection to a memorandum by submitting it to the SEC. 90 Be-
cause Steinhardt voluntarily disclosed the memo to the SEC, an adver-
sary, work-product protection was waived to other parties. 91 Judge Ten-
ney was unmoved by the argument that corporations would no longer
cooperate with the government and would be reluctant to investigate
internal wrongdoing.92  In the eyes of the court, there are "substantial
incentives" for corporations to cooperate with the SEC.93
Moreover, when a company voluntarily cooperates with a govern-
ment entity, it deliberately gives up some of the benefits of the adversar-
ial system in order to obtain the significant potential benefits of such
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id.
85. 129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997).
86. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 681-84 (Finding that the privilege is "governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience.").
87. Ashok M. Pinto, Cooperation and Self-Interest are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege through Production of Privileged Documents in a Government Investi-
gation, 106 W. VA L. REV. 359, 373 (2004).
88. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686 ("Anyone who chooses to disclose a privileged
document to a third party, or does so pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has an incen-
tive to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage. It would be perfectly possible to carve out
some of those disclosures and say that, although the disclosure itself is not necessary to foster attor-
ney-client communications, neither does it forfeit the privilege. With rare exceptions, courts have
been unwilling to start down this path--which has no logical terminus--and we join in this reluc-
tance.").
89. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
90. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
91. Id. at 234-35.
92. Id. at 235-36.
93. Id.
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cooperation.94 The fact that the defendant, faced with a federal probe
and a civil lawsuit, was forced to "make difficult choices is insufficient
justification for carving a substantial exception to the waiver doctrine. 95
The Second Circuit, however, declined to adopt a per se rule that all
voluntary disclosures to the government act as a waiver of work-product
protection.96 Instead, issues of selective waiver should be applied in a
common-sense manner on a "case-by-case basis.,
97
In Genentech v. United States International Trade Commission,
98
the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of selective waiver. 99 Genentech
filed a complaint against the United States International Trade Commis-
sion ("ITC") based on alleged violations of some of its patents. 00 In a
concurrent lawsuit against other competitors for patent infringement,
Genentech inadvertently disclosed several thousand documents. 01 After
an Indiana district court ruled that Genentech waived its privilege to the
documents, Genentech's opponents in the ITC proceedings requested
disclosure of the documents.1
0 2
The court disagreed with Genentech's view that waiver of a privi-
lege should be limited to proceedings in district court. 0 3 Genentech's
documents were not protected, the court reasoned, by the attorney-client
privilege because Genentech failed to use "'best efforts' to maintain the
confidentiality of the documents." 10 4  Instead of allowing waiver, the
court adopted a rule of general waiver that allows the documents from
district courts to be introduced in later court proceedings. 1
05
Finally, the Seventh Circuit discussed the idea of selective waiver in
dicta, in Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.10 6 The court explained
that materials in the government's investigative files were protected from
disclosure by the law enforcement investigatory privilege. 10 7 Judge Pos-
ner delivered the opinion of the court and noted that "[i]n the case of
selective disclosure, the courts feel, reasonably enough, that the posses-
sor of the privileged information should have been more careful, as by
94. Id.
95. Id. at 236.
96. Id. The court was concerned that a per se rule would fail to "anticipate situations in which
the disclosing party and the government may share a common interest in developing legal theories
and analyzing information," or those situations where the parties "entered into an explicit agree-
ment" that the materials would remain confidential. Id.
97. Id.
98. 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
99. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1415-18.
100. Id. at 1411-12.
101. Id. at 1413.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1416-17.
104. Id. at 1418.
105. Id.
106. 128 F.3d 1122, 1122 (7th Cir. 1997).
107. Dellwood Farms, 128 F.3d at 1124-26.
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obtaining an agreement by the person to whom they made the disclosure
not to spread it further."' 0 8 While the Seventh Circuit disavowed selec-
tive waiver in the cases before it, one may read this statement of the
court to argue for selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege where
there is a confidentiality agreement.
III. IN RE QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 0 9
This section outlines the facts and circumstances that led to the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Qwest.
A. Facts
In consolidated securities class actions against defendant Qwest,
lead plaintiff shareholders sought an order that Qwest turn over 220,000
pages of otherwise privileged material that it had produced to the SEC
and DOJ during investigations. 01 Prior to producing the documents,
Qwest entered into confidentiality agreements with the agencies whereby
Qwest stated that it did not intend to waive the attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection.11' Concurrently, a number of private plain-
tiffs sued Qwest alleging securities violations. 12 During the course of
the securities case, "Qwest produced millions of pages of documents to
the Plaintiffs, but did not produce the Waiver Documents."'' 13 The plain-
tiffs later sought the disclosure documents through discovery." 4 Qwest
asserted that it had only selectively waived the privilege and that waiver
only applied to the government agencies, not the plaintiffs." 5 The mag-
istrate judge ruled that Qwest waived protection by producing the docu-
ments to the SEC and DOJ and ordered Qwest to produce the waiver
documents to the plaintiffs. 116  Qwest refused. The district court af-
firmed the magistrate's decision and further required Qwest to produce
certain reports prepared by its counsel. 1
7
Qwest filed a motion to reconsider the order to produce the docu-
ments and to certify an interlocutory appeal, which was granted in part
by the district court."18 However, the district court declined to certify the
108. Id. at 1127.
109. 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
110. In re Qwest CommcnsInt, 450 F.3d at 1181.
111. Id. The confidentiality agreements stated, in relevant part, that the protected documents
would not be disclosed, except to the extent that those agencies determined that disclosure would be
"'required by law or... in furtherance of the Commission's discharge of its duties and responsibili-
ties." Id.
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interlocutory appeal on the waiver issue. 1 9 Subsequently, Qwest filed awrit of mandamus in the Tenth Circuit on the waiver issue.120
B. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected Qwest's argument that agreements with
the SEC and DOJ prevented disclosure to third parties. 12' The court re-
viewed other federal circuit court decisions addressing selective waiver
and found only the Eighth Circuit had adopted the rule in "circumstances
applicable to Qwest."' 122 Based on the record in the case, the court held:
(1) a selective waiver rule is not necessary to ensure Qwest's cooperation
with the government; 123 (2) the confidentiality agreement between Qwest
and the SEC and DOJ granted the government agencies "broad discretion
to use the Waiver Documents ... and any restrictions on their use were
loose in practice;"' 124 (3) a selective waiver rule will not promote the at-
torney-client privilege or work product doctrine; 125 (4) refusal to adopt a
selective waiver rule did not result in unfairness to Qwest; 126 (5) the case
law did not support selective waiver; 127 (6) Qwest advocated a new gov-
ernment investigation privilege; 128 and (7) the record is silent "regarding
[the] existence, significance, and longevity" of the purported "culture of
waiver."129
The court began its analysis with the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine, finding protection provided by both were lost if
confidential information is disclosed to a third party.' 30  The court re-
viewed cases for and against selective waiver, noting the majority of
federal circuits rejecting selective waiver.13 1 Furthermore, the court
found a waiver of protection, regardless of the existence of a confidenti-
ality agreement covering the waiver, noting that a disclosing party uses
voluntary disclosure as a means to "forestall prosecution ... or to obtain
lenient treatment.'
132
In rejecting selective waiver, the Tenth Circuit stated that the com-
mon law moves "slowly and by accretion," thus precluding it from
adopting selective waiver because such a rule "would be a leap.., in the
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1181.
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id. at 1193 (Qwest made the decision to disclose, notwithstanding the almost unanimous
circuit-court rejection of selective waiver and the lack of Tenth Circuit precedent).
124. Id. at 1194.
125. Id. at 1195.
126. Id. at 1196 (explaining that allowing a party to "choose who among its opponents would
be privy to the Waiver Documents is far from a universally accepted perspective of fairness").
127. ld. at 1196-97.
128. Id. at 1197-99.
129. Id. at 1199-1200.
130. Id. at 1185-86.
131. Id at 1187.
132. Id. at 1190.
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common law development of privileges and protections." '133 The court
characterized selective waiver as "the substantial equivalent of a new
privilege."' 134  As the Supreme Court has "declined to recognize new
privileges," such a marked shift in the law should derive from the legisla-
ture, not the courts.' 35 If a change is to be made, it is the province of the
legislature to determine whether voluntary privileges are "so important
that they deserve special treatment."'
136
The Tenth Circuit stated that the record before it did little to "sup-
port the contention that companies will cease cooperating with law en-
forcement absent protection under the selective waiver doctrine., 137 In-
stead, Qwest voluntarily disclosed materials, notwithstanding the unani-
mous federal circuit court rejection and lack of Tenth Circuit precedent
on the issue.' 38 Although the Tenth Circuit did not find confidentiality
agreements "irrelevant," as other courts have, the court concluded
Qwest's confidentiality agreements "do not support adoption of selective
waiver," because they allow for widespread disclosure at the discretion
of the SEC and DOJ. 139 Furthermore, broadening the reach of the privi-
lege or protection might have the opposite effect of inhibiting communi-
cation between attorney and client because employees may be reluctant
to fully disclose information to their employer.14
0
Addressing the tactical nature of the waiver decision, the court
noted that allowing Qwest to choose among its opponents that "would be
privy to the Waiver Documents is far from a universally accepted per-
spective of fairness."' 14 1  Instead, adopting the doctrine of selective
waiver would be "another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and
manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage."'' 42 Qwest, perceiv-
ing an obvious advantage from disclosure, "hedged its bets" that the
documents would be covered by selective waiver, thus accepting the
133. Id. at 1192.
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Id. at 1197-99 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972)). To support its
position, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that both Congress and the SEC have declined to adopt selec-
tive waiver with regard to the Securities and Exchange Act. Id. at 1198. Furthermore, the court
argued that courts in general are not the appropriate forum for such change. Id. at 1199.
136. Id. at 1200-01 (citing In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1375 (D.C. Cir.
1984)); see also McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
("Given the Legislature's expressed desire to control evidentiary privileges and protections, adoption
of the selective waiver theory should come from that body.").
137. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1193.
138. Id.; cf In re M & L Business Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993) (the only
Colorado district court case supporting the idea of selective waiver was rejected by the Tenth Circuit
because, unlike Qwest, the bank in M & L took "substantial steps" to ensure confidentiality, did not
disclose documents to benefit itself, and the fact that the documents did not pertain to a government
investigation).
139. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194.
140. Id. at 1195.
141. Id. at 1196.
142. Id. at 1188 (quoting Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235).
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possible resulting consequences.143 In the eyes of the Tenth Circuit, this
gamble was evidence that adoption of a selective waiver rule was not
necessary to preclude Qwest from being unfairly treated.'44
Finally, the court addressed the purported culture of waiver ad-
vanced by Qwest and supported by amici.145 The court found the "anec-
dotal material" serving as the foundation for the purported "culture of
waiver," was silent regarding its "existence, significance, or longev-
ity.' 1 46 Furthermore, the record was "silent about Qwest's particular
dealings with the agencies and whether it experienced the tactics de-
plored in amici.' 47 However, the court's interest in the specific tactics
employed by the agencies suggests that a well-documented record of
coercion may be important for parties seeking to claim that disclosure
does not result in selective waiver.1
48
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit in Qwest Communications International passed
on the opportunity to clarify much of the confusion and legitimate con-
cern underlying selective waiver. The court left open many of the impor-
tant questions and issues plaguing attorneys facing a waiver request by
stating that the facts in the case counsel against allowing a waiver. To
clarify the issue of selective waiver and once again give credence to the
privileges and protections that lie at the very foundation of the jurispru-
dential system, five distinct areas must be addressed and clarified: 1) the
routine practice of government officials seeking a waiver during gov-
ernment investigations; 2) the language of proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502(c); 3) the validity of confidentiality agreements in conjunction
with a selective waiver; 4) the policy concerns favoring a practical selec-
tive waiver rule; and 5) the purported chilling effect selective waiver will
have on employee communications with corporate counsel. Clarifying
these issues will provide strength to the privileges and protections of the
United States legal system and further eliminate barriers to corporate
cooperation with government investigations.
A. Government Practices and Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
502(c)
This section discusses the current practice of government agencies
of actively seeking waivers. While DOJ and SEC policies promote hon-
esty and fair dealings with the government and investing public, these
policies also undermine attorney-client relations. The DOJ revised its
143. Id. at 1196.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1199.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1199-2000.
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corporate investigation guidelines late in 2006, but the new guidelines
are a modest improvement over previous practices. 149 The Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules ("Advisory Commit-
tee") has stepped into the controversy by proposing a new waiver rule.
However, the new waiver rule does little to curb current problems and
creates new challenges for attorneys.
1. Culture of Waiver: Coercive Government Waiver Tactics
A major concern facing corporations today is the "culture of
waiver" established by government agencies during investigations.150
Essentially, the argument is that DOJ15 1 and SEC 52 practices effectively
deputize corporate America as an arm of law enforcement during the
course of an investigation by pressuring corporate attorneys to voluntar-
ily disclose materials to receive cooperation credit. 153 The Tenth Circuit
all but dismissed the "culture of waiver" by referring to the "anecdotal
material" serving as its foundation.154 While the Tenth Circuit dismissed
the evidence Qwest put forth to support the existence of the culture of
waiver, the evidence has caught the attention of several "prominent legal
149. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Thompson
Memorandum, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
150. See The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, Survey Results
Presented to U.S. Congress and U.S. Sentencing Commission by Am. Chemistry Council et al., at 3
(2006) [hereinafter Corporate Survey Results], available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/
attyclient2.pdf.
151. The DOJ's policy was originally outlined in the in the 1999 "Holder Memorandum."
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Bringing Criminal Charges
Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html. The Holder Memorandum was
later refined in the 2003 "Thompson Memorandum," which encouraged federal prosecutors to re-
quest companies to waive its privileges as a condition for receiving cooperation credit during an
investigation. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 2. The Thompson Memorandum was refined in
the 2006 McNulty Memorandum, making it more difficult for the government to force companies to
disclose privileged materials and communications. However, the McNulty Memorandum makes
clear that prosecutors can always consider favorably decisions to waive the attorney-client privilege.
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2.
152. The SEC articulated its policy in the 2001 Seaboard Report, whereby it would grant
leniency for cooperation with SEC investigations. Seaboard Report, supra note 3, at *2-3. The
Seaboard Report noted generally that "when businesses seek out, self-report and rectify illegal
conduct, and otherwise cooperate with Commission staff, large expenditures of government and
shareholder resources can be avoided and investors can benefit promptly." Id. at * 1. Accordingly,
the SEC set forth some criteria it will consider in determining whether, and how much, to credit,
among other things, cooperation, during an investigation. Id. at *2. In a January 2006 press release,
the SEC reaffirmed the importance of cooperation in determining whether financial penalties will be
imposed on corporations. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
153. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 3. In January 2006, the Association of
Corporate Counsel compiled the results of a survey sent to 4,700 members. Id. at 2 n.7. Of those
responding to the survey, fifty-two percent of inside-counsel and fifty-nine percent of outside-
counsel responded affirmatively to the question of whether there had been a "marked increase in
waiver requests as a condition of cooperation." Id. at 3.
154. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1199.
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organizations," "three branches of the federal government,",155 and a re-
cent district court.1 56 Waiver requests have become so common that the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York "has publicly called
for a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege by all corporate
targets wishing to obtain" cooperation credit. 157 As further evidence of
the problem, a 2006 survey of over 1,200 in-house counsel and outside
corporate counsel indicated a marked increase in waiver requests as a
condition to receiving cooperation credit. 158 Recent DOJ policies have
sought to curtail the routine demand for waiver through a written review
process. 159  Unfortunately, the new DOJ guidelines impose token re-
straints on the ability of the government to demand a waiver and do little
to curb the culture of waiver.
1 60
The Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that corporations have to
make choices that greatly restrict their ability to effectively protect and
defend themselves during a government investigation. By making
waiver of the privilege to confidential material a prerequisite to receiving
cooperation credit, the government has created a self-serving blueprint
that allows them to determine whether a corporation should be indicted.
With this leverage, the government can demand disclosure of "privileged
information at the outset" of the investigation, and the corporation is left
with "no rational choice" but to cooperate. 161 While current DOJ and
SEC policies represent a well-intentioned attempt to prevent continued
corporate wrongdoing and encourage voluntary disclosure, the reality is
that these policies permit the government to condition cooperation credit
on the thoroughness of the disclosure by the corporation. 62 In essence,
government agencies exploit their power to gain a tactical advantage
over corporations.
There are legitimate arguments that the benefits of DOJ and SEC
policies outweigh the erosion of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine. Namely, that corporate wrongdoing can be
rooted out quickly, corporate value can be protected, and the investing
155. Judson W. Starr & Michael S. Munson, Is the Pendulum Swinging Back on Waiver Is-
sues?, A.B.A ENVTL. AND ENERGY Bus. LAW REPORTER, at 8 (June 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL400000pub/newsletter/200606/starr-munson.pdf.
156. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
157. Letter from Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association, to the Honorable Howard Coble,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, at 3 (Mar. 3, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/0603031etter-acprivh.pdf.
158. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 2.
159. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8-11.
160. See Jonathan Peterson & Kathy M. Kristof, U.S. Eases Its Tactics on Suspect Finns, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at C1.
161. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of
Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 154 (2000).
162. See Corporate Survey Results, supra note 150, at 3. This practice will continue under the
McNulty Memorandum because prosecutors "may always" consider a declination of waiver in
making its charging decision and will continue to look favorably upon corporate acquiescence to
government waiver requests. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 10.
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public can be protected. 163 However, DOJ and SEC policies convey a
message that longstanding privileges are not reliable in the corporate
context, and are dismissive of a corporation's right to a balanced playing
field in the adversarial process. Moreover, the nature of the agencies
policies suggests that the government is "manipulating" the privilege, not
the corporations. 164 The SEC and DOJ are the ones coercing corpora-
tions to waive its protections "or else,"' 165 thus, "having their cake and
eating it too.' 16 6 To level the playing field and once again give corpora-
tions a valid choice on whether to disclose, DOJ and SEC policies must
be abolished or amended.
2. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
In 2006, the Advisory Committee began accepting comments to
proposed Rule 502, entitled "Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Prod-
uct; Limitations on Waiver," governing issues such as selective
waiver.1 67  The rule seeks to rectify the conflict among federal circuit
courts that disclosure of protected information during a government in-
vestigation does not constitute a general waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege or work-product protection.' 68  Additionally, the rule purportedly
furthers the "important policy of cooperation with government agencies,
and maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of government investiga-
tions."1
69
However, Rule 502(c) will not reduce the "burden, expense, and
complexity associated with privilege evaluations of documents pro-
duced" during government investigations. 70  First, the Rule does not
clearly protect materials covered by the attorney-client privilege and
163. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1.
164. See Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221 (referring to the idea that selective waiver doctrine
allows a party to manipulate use of the privilege through selective assertion).
165. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53 (noting that the government overstepped its bounds of
constitutionality when it pressured KPMG, facing indictment, into cutting off the legal fees of its
former personnel). The court found that KPMG's choice to do so was improperly influenced by the
Thompson Memorandum. Id. at 380.
166. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *9.
167. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Proposed Rule 502 on Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product, at 6 (June 30, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Evidence Rules], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-
2006.pdf. Proposed Rule 502(c) states, in relevant part, that
a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege
or work product protection-when made to a federal public office or agency in the exer-
cise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority-does not operate as a
waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities.
Id. at 7.
168. See id. at 13.
169. See id. at 14.
170. Letter from Matthew R. Gemello & Steven B. Stokdyk, Co-Chairs, Corporations Commit-
tee, of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California, to Professor Daniel J. Capra & Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, at 2 (Apr. 14, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-EV-001 .pdf.
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work-product doctrine. The ambiguous language of the Rule leaves open
for interpretation what an "investigation" by an agency is, who is a "per-
son" involved in the investigation, and what is protected disclosure mate-
rial or information. Second, the proposed selective waiver rule will con-
flict with state evidence rules that do not recognize selective waiver.
This will further exacerbate the problem because no uniform or clear rule
will exist governing attorney-client relationships in all jurisdictions.
171
Thus, selective waiver may initially provide protection in one jurisdiction
but will be lost because of different treatment in another jurisdiction.
Third, the proposed rule might have the impact of creating a presumption
on the part of the government that it is appropriate to demand waiver in
all circumstances.172 In essence, it may become a more coercive weapon
than current government policies because it destroys any resistance ar-
gument; thus, providing the government with unfettered access to privi-
leged materials because a federal evidence rule now protects the informa-
tion. 173  Finally, the proposed rule is unclear on how a government's
agreement to confidentiality may limit, or conflict, with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 174 and Brady v. Maryland.175 The broad language
of proposed Rule 502(c) fails to provide guidance or comfort in favor of
the interpretation that Rule 502 supersedes "Rule 16 or Brady and its
progeny."' 76 That is not the kind of protection or certainty the attorney-
client privilege is meant to foster.
B. Confidentiality Agreements: A Valid Means of Disclosure
Corporations frequently seek protection during a government inves-
tigation by entering into a confidentiality agreement with the govern-
ment. Many corporations do so with the belief that confidential materials
will be protected from disclosure to third-parties outside of the govern-
ment investigation. Court decisions addressing the issue of selective
waiver pursuant to a confidentiality agreement are less than homoge-
nous.' 77 Some courts have indicated that the existence of a confidential-
171. See McKesson HBOC Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 821 n.l 1 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (demonstrating that action taken in one jurisdiction that may constitute a waiver may nonethe-
less result in waiver in another jurisdiction).
172. See David M. Brodsky et al., Preserving The Attorney-Client Privilege, at 3 (Apr. 19,
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brodsky.pdf.
173. Id. at8.
174. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(B) (holding in relevant part that "upon a defendant's request,
the government must disclose to the defendant, and make available for inspection, copying, or pho-
tographing, all of the following ... any relevant written or recorded statement by the defendant if:
the statement is within the government's possession, custody, or control; and the attorney for the
government knows--or through due diligence could know--that the statement exists.").
175. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating that criminal defendants are entitled to information in the
government's possession material to their defense).
176. Lauren Rosenblatt, Will Selective Waiver Become A Reality Under Proposed Rule 502?,
BUSINESS CRIMES BULLETIN, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jspid=
1155732412262.
177. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1429, with In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l,
450 F.3d at 1194.
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ity agreement is irrelevant to a waiver of privileges. 178  The prevailing
argument among these courts rests on traditional waiver theories that
disclosure to a third-party waives to all, 179 and because the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine are not "creatures of con-
tract., 180 The Advisory Committee on Rule 502 objects to confidential-
ity agreements entered into prior to disclosure, arguing that disputes will
likely arise over the particulars of the confidentiality agreement.1 81 Yet
other courts, including the Tenth Circuit in Qwest, 182 indicate that the
existence of a confidentiality agreement does not foreclose selective
waiver if the agreement actually restricts use of the documents. 1
83
Instead of adopting a per se rule that a confidentiality agreement is
or is not valid, courts should evaluate waiver pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement on a case-by-case basis. 84 Some factors to take into account
include the following: (1) whether waiver is necessary for the govern-
ment to uncover the information in the first place; (2) the reasonable pre-
cautions taken to protect the waiver documents; (3) the scope of the
waiver; (4) who is benefited by the waiver; and (5) the overreaching is-
sues of fairness.185 Evaluating selective waiver on a case-by-case basis is
beneficial because it does not automatically give protection to a corpora-
tion where the confidentiality agreement does little to protect the docu-
ments, as was the case in Qwest, 186 and gives protection to others where
the confidentiality agreement strictly construes the waiver provisions.
Moreover, allowing confidentiality agreements that contain adequate
protection encourages self-policing and prompt disclosure by corpora-
tions without fear that waiver to the government will result in subsequent
disclosure to actual or potential adversaries. 87  Although corporations
178. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 1430; In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at
303.
179. See Dellwood Farms, Inc., 128 F.3d at 1127.
180. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303.
181. Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, supra note 166, at 14.
182. In re Qwest Commc "ns. Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194 (not strictly precluding the use of confi-
dentiality agreements, but rather, stating that Qwest confidentiality agreement did little to restrict the
SEC's and DOJ's use of the materials they received from Qwest).
183. See Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236; In re Natural Gas Commodities Litig., No.
03CIV.6186 (VM)(JCF), 2005 WL 3288007, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2005); Nancy Horton Burke,
The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver of the Attorney-Client and Work
Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 62-67 (1997) (setting forth factors courts have examined
when evaluating a confidentiality agreement purportedly protecting privileged documents).
184. This position is congruent with the wording of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 that allows
courts to create rules on a case-by-case basis that conform with Rule 501. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
Commentary to the rule states that "Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire not to freeze the law
of privilege but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-
by-case basis... " FED. R. EVID. 501, Commentary by Stephen A. Saltzburg, Daniel J. Capra, and
Michael M. Martin.
185. See GERGACZ, supra note 31, §§ 5.11, 5.13-5.16.
186. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d at 1194.
187. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Intervenor-Appellant, Mckesson Corp., at *4, 403 F.3d 1048 (2006) (No. 03-10511); United States
v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004).
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may gain from disclosing material through a confidentiality agreement,
they do so at the expense of divulging "highly sensitive and incriminat-
ing information" and are not absolved from liability of the acts dis-
closed.
188
There is a balance already in play whether a corporation should air
its grievances in order to cooperate or force the government to go it alone
at the cost of more stringent treatment and increased expense. 89 A prac-
tical rule that allows waiver pursuant to a confidentiality agreement that
explicitly states which documents are being disclosed and to what extent,
further strengthens the genuineness of the corporations' desire to main-
tain protection to the documents 190 and prevents use of waiver as a tacti-
cal advantage. While this may not absolutely forestall a government
agency from disclosing the material,' 9' it may provide the corporation
with a shield of protection, not a sword, should litigation arise over the
terms of the confidentiality agreement.'
92
On a practical level, society demands an assessment of the action or
inaction of the corporation in terms broader than merely the corpora-
tion's waiver. The significance of intent should not be overlooked
through a knee-jerk reaction that rejects outright the theory of selective
waiver. 93 Applying objective standards of interpretation to a confidenti-
ality agreement, including the factors outlined above, it becomes difficult
to reject selective waiver. Such a rule accounts for the intent of the cor-
poration and continues to treat carelessness and negligence as subversive
to the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege.
C. Public Policy Favors a Practical Selective Waiver Rule
The preference for or against selective waiver is nothing more than
a policy consideration and has very little to do with furthering the princi-
ples of the attorney-client privilege. 94 What has to be weighed is the
prohibition on waivers that will likely aid public regulatory agencies
against the public good that will result from thorough government inves-
tigations. In reality, continued prohibition against selective waiver mod-
estly benefits the attorney-client privilege, while decreasing the efficacy
of costly governmental investigations.
188. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
189. Id.
190. See In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235.
191. See, e.g., In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 636, 646 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding
confidentiality agreement under which SEC could disclose documents as required by law or in
furtherance of its discharge of its duties and responsibilities to be "conditional" and thus "inconsis-
tent with those cases ... allowing selective waiver.").
192. See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306-07 (referring to the attorney-client privilege, the
court states that "there is no reason to transform the work product doctrine into another 'brush on the
attorney's palette,' used as a sword rather than a shield.").
193. See id. at 307.
194. Id. at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (finding that the "exclusion of privileged information
conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist without the privilege").
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Upjohn stated that an asserted privilege must "serve[] public
ends."'195 A practical selective waiver rule will serve public ends by in-
creasing judicial economy and fairness among parties. The public inter-
est is clearly served when the government can expeditiously root out and
prosecute wrongdoing and provide prompt relief to injured parties.
196
Conversely, the public interest is not well-served when the government is
forced to obtain information through lengthy investigations that consume
precious government resources. 197 In contrast to the significant public
interest in recognizing a selective waiver privilege, a per se rule against
selective waiver in the government investigation context will exclude
reliable and probative evidence of wrongdoing. 1
98
The Tenth Circuit cites Branzburg v. Hayes'99 and the absence of a
selective waiver privilege from the nine specific privileges drafted by the
Judicial Conference Advisory committee, as evidence that a new selec-
tive waiver rule should not be allowed.2 °° In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court declined to create a new reporters' privilege against compulsion
from testifying before a grand jury given the lack of evidence that such a
privilege would restrict the flow of news to the public. 20 1 The Supreme
Court noted the public interest of pursuing and punishing criminal behav-
ior outweighs the interest in possible future news stories.20 2 If the public
interest in pursuing and punishing criminal behavior in the corporate
context is of such tantamount importance, why would a selective waiver
rule directed at that very goal, be unwise? Moreover, in rejecting the
proposed nine privileges and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested an
affirmative intention not to "freeze the law of privilege., 20 3  Because
Congress rejected the Advisory Committee's nine-privilege proposal, the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 501 is, unlike the Notes to most of the
other Rules, not to be solely relied on in construing the Rule. Rule 501
was introduced to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis," and to allow change. 204 The law
occasionally adheres to concepts long after experience suggests that a
195. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
196. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (privileges may be justified by a
"'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining the truth."' (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting))).
197. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (recognizing that "[e]ncouraging corporations to
disclose their internal investigations confidentially allows the SEC to resolve its investigations
expeditiously and efficiently.").
198. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the
occasional injustice that will result from a categorical rule excluding all reliable and probative evi-
dence).
199. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
200. See In re Qwest Commcns. Intl, 450 F.3d at 1197.
201. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94.
202. Id. at 695.
203. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
204. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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change is necessary. 20 5 Reason and experience no longer justify so re-
strictive a privilege in the corporate investigation context.
Modification to the attorney-client privilege furthers the important
public interest in transparent corporate investigations without unduly
burdening the adversarial system.2°6 By protecting the documents, third-
party plaintiffs will be hard pressed to form a valid argument that they
will be adversely affected by not having access to the documents because
they would not be privy to the information in the first place.207 Further-
more, if the third-party can show sufficient need for the materials, they
will be able to obtain them through a court order.20 8 Thus, the justifica-
tion for rejecting selective waiver seems "inadequate to override the
strong public interest such a rule would serve.', 20 9  Because litigants
should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in disclosure of materi-
als during a government investigation, a rule of selective waiver should
be adopted.
D. Employee Communications with Corporate Counsel
Parties opposing selective waiver continually point to the purported
"chilling" affect such a rule may have on employee communication with
corporate counsel.210  However, given the nature of the em-
ployee/employer relationship, how likely is it that an employee will be
discouraged from disclosing pertinent information out of fear of disclo-
sure in subsequent litigation?21' Not a single circuit court case, bar asso-
ciation study, or scholarly article has provided a concrete answer; and
they cannot possibly because it depends entirely on the scope of the
waiver, which the courts have been unable to delineate. 212 The mere fact
205. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (declining to "enforce the ancient rule of
the common law under conditions as they now exist."); see also Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,
471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) ("When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can
be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it.").
206. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at * 10-11.
207. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 ("Application of the attorney-client privilege to communication
such as those involved here ... puts an adversary in no worse position than if the communication
had never taken place."); Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 309 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (finding that the
"exclusion of privileged information conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist
without the privilege."); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d at 142 n. 14 (noting that it is not "inher-
ently unfair for a party to selectively disclose privileged information in one proceeding but not
another" because "when a client discloses privileged information to a government agency, the pri-
vate litigant in subsequent proceedings is no worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to
the agency not occurred."); Saito, 2002 WL 316572622, at *6 ("fairness has little relevance in the
context of selective waivers ... because disclosure to one adversary does not prejudice a subsequent
adversary any more than it would have if the initial disclosure had never been made.").
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (holding that "[w]here relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.").
209. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *10.
210. See Brodsky, supra note 172, at 5 (referring to the uncertainty employees will feel if there
are no reliable privilege protections).
211. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See Hon. Arlen Specter & Hon. Patrick Leahy, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Negative Impact for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American Legal System,
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that a legal communication was made in an express or implied confiden-
tial relationship, such as between an employee and corporate counsel,
does not create or guarantee a privilege.213 Corporate obligations to
maintain promised confidentiality is limited to the amount of confidenti-
ality organizations have within their power granted by the law. Thus,
organizations cannot promise to keep factual revelations confidential in
the face of a valid discovery request that does not improperly invade the
attorney-client privilege.
Finally, there is no guarantee that an employee who discloses mis-
conduct to corporate counsel will not end up being the scapegoat at the
expense of a more legally sophisticated superior, who manages to remain
silent. 21 4  In other words, it is possible that the flawed attorney-client
dynamic that commentators attribute to government waiver policies actu-
ally pre-dates selective waiver.215 As a result, the alarms and doomsday
predictions over the degradation of the attomey-client privilege as a re-
sult of persistent waiver requests, could be much ado about nothing.
In essence, the only real protection an employee has is silence.216
But rarely do employees keep quiet about wrongdoing, either out of fear
of losing employment, loyalty to the company, or apprehension about
opposing a superior who has asked the employee to disclose the wrong-
doing.2 17 Whether the employee knows it or not, their communication
with corporate counsel is already "chilled," and there is no concrete evi-
dence that disclosure of that information during a government investiga-
tion will exacerbate that problem.
CONCLUSION
In today's enforcement environment, a waiver is not voluntary in a
real-world sense.218 The majority of courts have not caught on to that
fact and rule that the resulting disclosures are sufficiently voluntary to
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, at 11 (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/coalitionsenjudtestimony.pdf. The submission reported
statistics from the survey conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel that in-house lawyers
"believe" there will be a chilling effect on the candor of information from client. Id.
213. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2286 ("No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail
against demand for the truth in a court ofjustice."); see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 n.21.
214. See United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing that a corpo-
ration could advance a defense that an employee had acted "ultra vires" on his own); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2000); LERMAN, supra note 13, at 185.
215. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response
to the Compelled- Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 904 (2006).
216. White, 322 U.S. at 698-99.
217. Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed
More Protection Than The Model Rules Provide?,'23 IND. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1990).
218. See Statement of Karen J. Mathis, President of the American Bar Association, before the
Committee on the Judiciary, at 4-5 (Sept 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of Karen J. Mathis],
available at http://www.abanet.org/.
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constitute a waiver.2 19 Thus, the common law does not take full consid-
eration of the legal authority wielded by government agencies to influ-
ence a waiver. In failing to recognize the pressures corporations face to
disclose materials and the lack of protection provided by current gov-
ernment practices and procedures, the Tenth Circuit, along with many
other courts and commentators, has lost sight of the larger picture in an
effort to protect the attorney-client privilege.
Now, more than ever, corporations have minimal protection from
government waiver requests. Since the DOJ and SEC have not ade-
quately addressed their current practices, 220 and because the courts can-
not seem to come to an understanding or define a clear rule regarding
selective waiver, Congress will have to address the matter.221 Congress
is the correct body of government to address the issue because a pro-
posed rule will alter the balance between two conflicting aspects of pub-
lic policy and will alter local variations that previously had undesirable
or ineffective results.222 Furthermore, Congress can override the con-
flicting case law and reach beyond limitations imposed on federal rules
to enact a statute applicable in the state courts and other forums not gov-
erned by Federal Rules of Evidence.223 With this oversight capacity,
Congress can send a message that current government policies that seek
waivers and the practical interpretations of prosecutors applying them are
at odds with the long-standing values of our jurisprudential system.224
219. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (noting that the government overstepped its bounds of
constitutionality when it pressured KPMG, facing indictment, into cutting off the legal fees of its
former personnel. The court found that KPMG's choice to do so was improperly influenced by the
Thompson Memorandum).
220. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
221. Congress is the correct governing body to enact a selective waiver rule because they have
congressional authority, conferred by the Commerce Clause, to regulate the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is a valid delegation of constitutional power under the commerce clause). Simi-
larly, the Department of Justice is authorized, as an executive agency under the Judiciary Act of
1870, to enforce criminal and civil laws enacted by Congress. See Judiciary Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16
Stat. 162 (1870); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) (finding that execu-
tive agencies may be called upon to enforce laws enacted under Congress' Article I powers). There-
fore, Congress, after enacting a selective waiver law, may call on other branches to assist in its
enforcement.
222. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (suggesting that Congress or the state legislatures should
consider implementing a proposed privilege); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074(b) (West 2007) ("Any such rule
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless ap-
proved by an Act of Congress."); see Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218, at 13.
223. See Rosenblatt, supra note 176; see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (stating
the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law, a conclusion mandated by the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)
("Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, '[t]he relative importance to the State of
its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law,' for 'any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal
law, must yield."' (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962))); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
103 F.3d 1140, 1155 (3d Cir. 1997) (Congress "has recognized the importance of privilege rules
insofar as the truth-seeking process is concerned.. . It did so by identifying and designating the law
of privileges as a special area meriting greater legislative oversight.").
224. See Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218, at 13-14.
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The question then becomes: To what extent selective waiver should
be codified through congressional action? The popular "pro-
privilege/anti-waiver ''225 stance rejects selective waiver because it pur-
portedly weakens the attorney-client privilege;226 however, this position
fails to account for situations where a party exercised reasonable care
and prudence to protect information from disclosure to third parties, such
as a confidentiality agreement. 27 Other means, such as a new rule of
evidence, will provide scant relief from the problems that already plague
corporations. Reconstituting the privilege in such a way that takes into
consideration the current and foreseeable state of affairs will resolve the
circuit split and confirm the notion that privileges are not set in stone; but
rather, are meant to evolve over time. 28 Thus, reform efforts should be
directed towards defining the attorney-client privilege in a way that pre-
serves the protection in its most fundamental form, while encouraging
corporations to disclose information only in limited circumstances and
upon strict conformity with codified standards.
Adam Aldrich*
225. Brown, supra note 215, at 951.
226. See generally Statement of Karen J. Mathis, supra note 218.
227. Senator Spector of Pennsylvania introduced an attorney-client privilege bill in late 2006
that addressed problems that have developed since the Thompson Memorandum; however, the
ambiguous language of the proposal leaves open important questions concerning violations and
remedies if the law is broken. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/thompsonmemoleg.pdf. Furthermore,
the categorical prohibition against waivers may create a worse situation than what we have now
because attorneys could stonewall prosecutors and render any investigation dead in the water. While
Senator Spector's bill is a well intentioned attempt to thwart the policies of various government
agencies, several issues need to be explored and clarified if Congress is going to pursue this or a
similar bill.
228. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958) (changes in privileges may be
"dictated by 'reason and experience').
* J.D. Candidate 2008.
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